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I. INTRODUCTION
At its most fundamental level, the current debate over the
universality of human rights legal standards versus cultural relativism
is the result of the Western and Eastern nations, and capitalist and
socialist countries each speaking a different language of human
rights. When a Chinese government official refers to human rights
law in China, he means something different from that which is
understood as human rights in the Western context or human rights
as defined by the international community of the United Nations.
Human rights in the Chinese cultural context does not mean inherent,
inalienable rights owed to the individual by sole virtue of being
human and under duty of the state, as it does in the West. Instead, the
Chinese rights refer to the intricate web of social and political duties
of citizens owed to the community at large. Furthermore, in direct
contrast to the international model, human rights law -- indeed all law
in China -- is controlled by and at the service of the authoritarian
political system and prevailing state ideology.
In June 1993, more than 180 nations met in Vienna, Austria'
in order to hammer out differences in national perceptions of
international human rights law that had evolved over the past twenty-
five years since the last World Human Rights Conference. Their goal
was to reach a mutual understanding and universal approach to
human rights norms, fundamental freedoms and enforcement
mechanisms. The two governments most ideologically polarized
from each other and most vocal in their positions were the United
States of America and the People's Republic of China.
This paper will examine the Chinese perception of human
rights and the Chinese human rights legal system. It will compare
and contrast it with the international human rights model embodied
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights' and the International
'United Nations World Conference on Human Rights: Vienna Declaration, adopted
June 25, 1993, 32 I. L. M. 1661 (993).
2 G.A. Res.217A, U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., U.N. Doe. A/810 (1948).
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Covenants of Civil and Political Rights,3 and Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights.4 It will also examine the concerns voiced by the
Chinese government over international human rights norms and
enforcement mechanisms. Finally, it will evaluate the culturally
relativistic model which is claimed by China, and compare it to the
Universality principle, which was endorsed by the international
community at the 1993 United Nations World Human Rights
Conference.
II. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS
A. The Evolution of International Human Rights from a Domestic
Prerogative to an International Concern
Prior to World War II, human rights vis d vis the individual
were not considered a valid concern of international law. Traditional
international law regulated relations between states, and the only
international human rights abuses that were recognized and capable
of being addressed were those committed against a foreign national.
Even then, any government abuse against the alien was considered to
be a violation against the foreign government, not against the
individual. No international human rights norms existed, and
standard-setting and enforcement were considered to be the
prerogative and under the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of domestic
government.5
Even where international cooperation was formalized in the
treaty which established the League of Nations in 1920, human rights
were not directly addressed by any provision in the League treaty.6
3 G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966).
4 Id.
5 JOHN P. HUMPHREY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE UNITED NATIONS: A GREAT
ADvENTURE 10 (1984).
6 THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN A NUTSHELL 5
(1988).
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The League of Nations did establish international jurisdiction over
and protection of specific displaced peoples, which, despite the fact
that it addressed "peoples" and not individuals, marks the beginning
of the internationalization of human rights law and individual
freedoms. The League set into place a Mandates System for the
citizens of the former colonies of the defeated nations of World War
I, whereby the victorious powers administered the territories for the
"well-being and development of the native peoples."7 The League
also accepted the responsibility for enforcing post-World War I
treaties for the protection of minority groups within newly
independent nations.8
During World War II, mass numbers of individuals were
victims of violence and suffered deplorable human rights abuses. The
victorious Allied Powers declared international jurisdiction over the
atrocities committed by the governments of the defeated nations.
They then proceeded to establish international human rights norms
and instruments of enforcement in order to guard against the
repetition of such mass-scale governmental abuses.9 The process
began at the San Francisco Conference in 1945, with the drafting of
the Charter of the United Nations organization.
B. The United Nations as an International System for Protecting
Human Rights
The United Nations Charter is an international legally binding
treaty establishing mutual obligations for the government signatories
7 LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 22.
BUERGENTHAL, supra note 6, at 8-11.
One impetus for the international community to begin to address human rights
across states boundaries was the result of the shared paternalistic sense of duty the
victorious powers felt toward the peoples who had been formerly under the
jurisdiction and control of the defeated nations of World War I. This international
jurisdiction over the protection of specific peoples was, in a sense, affirmatively
adopted colonial jurisdiction, acquired from the defeated powers and justified by
victory in the War.
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to act jointly and separately to "respect,"'0 "protect,"" and
"promote"'2 "human fights and fundamental freedoms for all without
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion."'3 The Charter
neither specifies nor defines the human rights that it proposes to
protect and promote.
International human fights norms and principles were finally
articulated in the Declaration of Human Rights, 4 a non-legally
binding document 15 drafted by the United Nations Commission on
Human Rights and adopted by the United Nations General Assembly
in 1948. The International Covenants on Human Rights, which
include the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 6 and the Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 7 provide a highly detailed
list of specific internationally sanctioned rights.
Unlike the Universal Declaration, 8 the Covenants' 9 are legally
binding treaties and as such, signatories are bound to honor the
provisions of the Covenants by instituting appropriate domestic
legislation.20 To date, the People's Republic of China has not ratified
either of the Covenants.2'
It must be noted, however, that despite the fact that China has
not ratified either Covenant, as a full member of the United Nations
and signatory to the United Nations Charter, many human rights and
international law authorities maintain that China has constructively
declared its commitment to the promotion and respect of international
10 U. N. CHARTER art. 56.
I Id.
12 Id.
13 Id. art. 55 (c).
14 G.A. Res. 217A, supra note 4.
is BUERGENTHAL, supra note 6, at 25.
16 G.A. Res. 2200A., supra note 3, at 49.
17 Id.
1" G.A. Res. 217A, supra note 4.
19 G.A. Res. 2200A, supra note 3, at 49.
20 THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL
RIGHTS 13-28 (Louis Henkin, ed., 1981).
21 Jean-Bernard Marie, International Instruments Relating To Human Rights, 14
HUM. RTs. L. J. 57, 62 (1993).
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human rights norms, as well as its acceptance of international
jurisdiction over human rights abuses.22
C. China's Objections to Internationally Prescribed Human Rights
Standards.
The principal objections articulated by the Chinese
government to the provisions of the two Covenants and to
internationally prescribed human rights standards are:
23
(1) International standard setting and regulation is a
relinquishment of national sovereignty over domestic
affairs.
(2) The Universal Declaration and International
Covenants define rights in a Western-biased manner
that is not directly applicable to the Chinese cultural,
political, or legal system.
1. International Jurisdiction over Human Rights: Is this an
Infringement on National Sovereignty over Domestic Affairs?
China's concern that international human rights enforcement is an
infringement on their national sovereignty is in direct opposition to
the international and United Nations view of human rights
enforcement. The more significant question, however, is not whether
international protection of human rights is an infringement on
domestic sovereignty, but whether it is an unlawful infringement and
further, whether the benefits to the world community outweigh the
22 Derived from the UN Charter, art. 56: "All Members pledge themselves to take
joint and separate action in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement
of the purposes set forth in Article 55." UN CHARTER art. 56. Human rights
scholar Burns H. Weston notes that it may be argued that the human rights
provisions of the United Nations Charter, because they are part of a legally binding
treaty, "clearly involve some element of legal obligation." Burns H. Weston,
Human Rights, 6 HUM. RTS. Q. 257, 272 (1984).
z' For a general discussion, refer to HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA (R.
Randle Edwards et. al. eds., 1986).
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measure of national sovereignty which is relinquished.
The internationalization of human rights described above
means that the international community, through the United Nations
system, has declared that human rights issues cross national
boundaries and are valid international concerns.24 China is a
voluntary member of the United Nations community and a signatory
to the United Nations Charter, and as such, is subject to its
international human rights enforcement decisions.5 A policy which
fiercely protects the integrity of domestic sovereignty at the expense
of human rights may result in harm to many individuals. A balancing
test of potential benefits to harms tips the argument in favor of
international protection and enforcement.
2. Are United Nations Human Rights Standards
Western-biased? The initiative to create a United Nations
organization and draft a Universal Declaration were, at first, Western
driven and the initial working draft of the Declaration was heavily
Western influenced.26 Despite this fact, the core drafting committee,
which painstakingly reviewed and reformulated the document over a
2 Weston notes the argument proposed by human rights authorities that "whatever
isolation [human rights] may have 'enjoyed' in the past, no longer can be considered
matters 'essentially within the domestic jurisdiction' of states." Weston, supra note
22, at 272.
' Robert F. Drinin et al., The 1991 Battle for Human Rights in China," 14 HUM.
RTS. Q. 21, 24 (1992).
26 John P. Humphrey, representative from Canada to the United Nations and the
first director of the United Nations Division of Human Rights, recounts his personal
experiences in producing the first draft working document for the Universal
Declaration. He was advised by P.C. Chang, representative from Nationalist China,
who was concerned over the potential for Western bias in the document, to put
aside all his other responsibilities for six months in order to study Chinese
philosophy. By his own account, Humphrey made light of this suggestion and
commenced drafting without any research into Asian philosophical distinctions.
Humphrey drew upon predominantly Western democratic sources and the resulting
draft, according to Humphrey, was a "combin[ation] of humanitarian liberalism with
social democracy." John P. Humphrey, Memoirs of John P. Humphrey: The First
Director of the United Nations Division of Human Rights," 5 HUM. RTs. Q. 387,
403-08, 412-15 (1983).
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nearly three-year period, consisted of Commission members from
diverse cultural and political backgrounds. Representatives came
from Australia, Chile, China, 7 France, Lebanon, the United States,
the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. During the drafting
process, ideological conflicts and political divisions arose between
capitalist and socialist,28 Western and Eastern, and Northern and
Southern nations. Some conflicts were resolved through
compromises in the language of specific articles; others were left
overly vague, with broad room for interpretation by a given country. 9
Thus, the final United Nations Charter, Universal Declaration
and the two International Covenants indeed were joint efforts,
synthesizing the input of the eighteen member countries of the United
Nations Human Rights Commission." Ultimately, the Declaration
was adopted with nearly full support of the General Assembly. Only
nine member nations out of fifty-six abstained or refused to vote at
all, including the Soviet Union, but not China.31 The end result is that
the document itself and the number and types of rights espoused,
encompassing civil and political as well as economic, social and
cultural rights, is not patently Western-biased.
This being said, a strong counter-argument can now be made
that in the nearly thirty years since its adoption, the Universal
Declaration and the Covenants have been interpreted by the United
Nations community from a heavily Western dominated perspective,
in part because of the overbearing political strength and influence of
27 "China" refers to Nationalist China, i.e. Taiwan.
28 The Soviet Union was the sole Communist representative of the core Drafting
Committee. At that time, China was in the grip of a civil war between the
Nationalist government and Communist forces.
29 Indeed, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in
the vague language of Article 2, can be interpreted to mean that such "rights" are
merely long-range goals and aspirations: "Each State Party... undertakes to take
steps, individually and through international assistance and co-operation... to the
maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full
realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant .... G.A. Res. 2200A,
supra note 3, art. 2.
30 HUMPHREY, supra note 5, at 17.
"' Id. at 71.
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the United States within the United Nations system. This Western
influence has resulted, until recently, in the United Nations human
rights division emphasizing civil and political rights, while economic,
social and cultural rights were delegated to the status of "second
generation rights." In fact, some Western nations, the United States
in particular, have refused to recognize in both their international and
domestic dealings, economic rights, as rights, at all.
Therefore, in actual practice, international norms and
enforcement mechanisms of human fights have indeed been biased in
favor of the Western emphasis on civil and political rights to the
detriment of economic, social, and cultural rights.
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHINESE CONCEPTION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW
The significance of the debate over civil and political rights
versus group rights and duties is revealed by the distinct historical
contexts of rights in the West and the East. The Western historical
tradition is premised on the belief that those who rule will seek to
keep and aggrandize their power at the expense of the common
person; that power corrupts. This cynicism and basic distrust of the
ruler leads to a culture of "us against them," and a popular concern
with controlling the power of the ruler. Traditional European feudal
society established a hierarchical social and political structure with
the sovereign at the apex of this conceptual pyramid. The European
sovereign was answerable to no one and no "heavenly" checks
circumscribed his power.
Political human rights represent a transfer of power from the
ruler to the individual, thereby providing some check on the ruler's
power. The Magna Carta in the thirteenth century was the first
popular curtailment of the sovereign's power. In the eighteenth
century, the American Declaration of Independence and the French
Declaration on the Rights of Man and of the Citizen were each a
symbolic and practical "taking" and transfer of power. In Western
democracies, this taking of power has resulted in the transfer of
political sovereignty from a single ruler or ruling class, to the
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populous, with the ultimate goal directed toward individual rights and
political liberty. Human rights, particularly civil and political rights,
have become a powerful tool for controlling power and protecting
individual freedoms.
The Chinese tradition, by contrast, begins with the Confucian
presumption that the leader is good and wise: a benign patriarch; a
father figure on-high; and the "son of heaven. 32 Within this scheme,
the traditional Chinese political system existed to maintain peace and
harmony on earth and between heaven and earth. Toward this goal,
the emperor was duty-bound according to the precepts of
Confucianism33 to promote the moral virtue and well-being of the
community. Beginning in the Chou Dynasty (1027-770 B.C.), the
Mandate of Heaven34 emerged as a natural check on the emperor's
power. Where the emperor was moral and just, and the people
obedient, harmony would prevail between heaven and earth and the
emperor would be supported by the Mandate of Heaven.35 If the ruler
proved not to be just and moral, and did not act for the good of the
people, then natural disasters, such as droughts or floods, and human
upheavals such as rebellions, might indicate a disruption in the
natural order and a possible heavenly withdrawal of the Mandate.
Affirmative political human rights have no place in the
traditional Chinese group-oriented and benign patriarchal heritage.
The Confucian culture attaches no importance to and creates no
impetus for such an artificial check on political power. The sovereign
is presumed to be the ultimate father who himself has duties
mandated by heaven. Instead, rights take the form of duties for all
men and define what one must do as a member of society, not what
one may do or what one has a right to do as an individual.
Three elements of Imperial China's social and legal tradition
32 JOHN KING FAIRBANK, THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA 17-27 (4th ed. 1979).
" Confucianism emerged as the dominant social, political and moral philosophy of
traditional China during the Han dynasty (206 B.C. - 220 A.D.). It continues to
exert a powerful moral and ideological influence to this day in modern Communist
China.
34 FAIRBANK, supra note 32, at 17.
35 Id.
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are particularly relevant to human rights law in modern China:
3 6
(1) The internalized and self-regulating social
behavior system described by Confucianism and
Daoism.
(2) The predominance of ideology over rule of law.
(3) The social policy in which community harmony
supersedes all other purposes for law and society.
These elements will now be discussed in the context of an historical
overview, beginning with the time of the first unification of China
through the present.
A. The Chinese Imperial Tradition
Any system of human rights law presupposes an established
legal system. In the absence of a system of law, human rights remain
amorphous concepts or mere aspirations, without clear definition and
with no means for defining or regulating them. The view of law
which emerged from China's Imperial history and which continues to
influence modern China's politics and human rights, rejected the
systematization of law in favor of an ideology-based, internalized,
self-regulating system of rites, rituals and customs.
For more than 2000 years, Imperial China rejected any legal
system that was based on external rules. Legal rules were viewed as
both inadequate to serve primary social goals and dangerous to these
goals. They were considered inadequate because positive law was
36 These three elements constitute a synthesis of discussions by several prominent
scholars in the fields of Chinese history and human rights. For more in-depth
treatment of these topics, refer to: Louis Henkin, The Human Rights Idea in
Contemporary China: A Comparative Perspective and Andrew Nathan, Sources of
Chinese Rights Thinking, in R. RANDLE EDWARDS ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS IN
CONTEMPORARY CHINA, supra note 23, at 7-39, 125-64; ANN KENT, HUMAN
RIGHTS IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (1990); R.P. Peerenboomi, Whats
Wrong with Chinese Rights?" in 6 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 29 (1993); and Karen
Turner, Rule of Law Ideals in Early China? 6 J. CHINESE L. I (1992).
1995-96] UNIVERSALITY VERSUS CULTURAL RELATIVISM 297
viewed as too rigid, externalized and artificial to regulate properly the
realities and complexities of social relationships. Positive law could
be downright dangerous because it was too easily manipulated by a
ruler to suit his own personal ends.
What we in the West would identify as rule of law3 7 would be
translated into Chinese asfazhi or "rule by law."38 This distinction
is important because modern democracies, particularly Western
democracies, generally view law as a body of rules and principles
which exist autonomously from, yet bear on, those who rule. When
changes are made in the law in a democratic legal system, extensive
procedural safeguards exist to protect against arbitrary or
discriminatory results. Of course, such procedural safeguards have
not always been in place in the West and even where they have
existed, their protective purpose has not always been achieved.39 The
Chinese perception of rule by law reflects the concern for potential
abuse to which any externalized legal system is vulnerable. Positive
law, according to the traditional Chinese view, exists to serve the
ruler in his personal interests, and rule by law is perceived as the tool
of the despot.4"
A sophisticated rules-based legal system was established
briefly in Imperial times during the Qin Dynasty (221-207 B.C.) by
Emperor Cheng, the first unifier of China. Legalism, as it is referred
to, was a rigid code system, supplemented with clearly defined
rewards and punishments.4' In practice, rule of law under Emperor
Cheng quickly deteriorated into despotism. The common man and
3 Rule of law refers to a legitimate, predictable system of law.
3 Rule by law indicates a legal system which controls the masses and may be
manipulated by the ruler for domination and subjugation. Turner, supra note 36,
at 2.
"' During feudal times in the West, the word of the sovereign was the law, with no
procedural safeguards to protect the interests of the common man. And, in the not-
so-distant past of the United States, during the Jim Crow era, positive law and
procedural safeguards were manipulated by those in power to subjugate African-
Americans.
" See Liang Zhiping, Explicating 'Law': A Comparative Perspective of Chinese
and Western Legal Culture, 3 J. CHINESEL. 55 (1989).
41 Id. at 81.
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scholars alike came to distrust Legalism because instead of the legal
code circumscribing the actions of the Emperor, Cheng manipulated
the legal system to serve his own ends and aggrandize his personal
wealth and power.4'
Repercussions from this brief interlude with a system of rule
of law persist in China to this day. Emperor Cheng is remembered by
Chinese historians 43 as a "monster"' and an enemy of the people.
Rule of law has never been rehabilitated in the eyes of the Chinese
people.
The legacy of this early experience under the Legalists is an
overriding distrust of rule of law and of legally based systems. The
favored legal philosophy which has preempted the rule of law idea in
China for over 2000 years emerged during the Han45 Dynasty (206
B.C. - 220 A.D.), and was based on Confucianism, which valued the
judgments of the moral scholar for good governing, and Daoism,
which depended on natural law.
Confucianism functioned in unison with Daoism. The
purpose of human society was to reflect the harmony or equilibrium
of nature -- the Dao -- by following the social precepts of
Confucianism. 46 The Dao has no direct translation into Western
languages and is loosely described as the "Way," or the proper order
of the universe. The Jingfa, an ancient Chinese text on the art of
ruling, describes the Dao as a "timeless, universal, impartial standard
and the law that it generates as a reliable guide for the hard decisions
42 Id.
"3 Western historians generally have been far less harsh in their evaluation of
Emperor Cheng and Legalism. In fact, the West continues to commemorate
Cheng's unification feat and his empire of Qin (pronounced "Chin") by the Western
name for the country: "China."
44 FREDERICK W. MOTE, INTELLECTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF CHINA 109, 112-13
(1989).
41 In direct contrast with the Western terminology identifying China with the
despotic Qin Dynasty, the Chinese refer to themselves as the "Han," in recognition
of the flowering of Confucianism during the Han Dynasty.
46 Turner, supra note 36, at 42.
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that fall to any ruler."47 The Emperor, as the "son of heaven," 48
guided human behavior in the service of the Dao. He stood at the
apex of the social hierarchy and served as the premier Confucian
scholar, as interpreter of Confucian tenets, as principal sage, as moral
and ethical leader, and as enforcer of the social code. The social
hierarchy extended the ruler-subject relationship downward through
society, figuratively linking every family head with the emperor
himself.
49
During the second century of the Han Dynasty, the rituals and
prescribed duties of Confucianism came to dominate the Classical
Chinese legal system and the Daoist philosophy became an
ideological force supporting Confucian precepts. A limited body of
positive law and legal sanctions was utilized only as a last resort for
severe violations committed by the common man.50 Where severe
disputes arose that could not be satisfied by community sanction,
formal mediation was employed. The moral codes and social duties
of Confucianism, as interpreted by the intelligentsia and ultimately by
the Emperor himself, became internalized by both the common man
and the official alike. Confucianism became the primary method by
which rulers maintained social order and discipline. This
self-policing approach to social regulation was preferred absolutely
over the Legalist external system of rules and laws. As Confucius
wrote in the fifth century B.C.
Guide [the common man] by edicts, keep [him] in line
with punishments, and [he] will stay out of trouble but
will have no sense of shame. Guide [him] by virtue,
keep [him] in line with the rites, and [he] will, besides
having a sense of shame, reform [himself]. 5'
47 Id. at 23.
48 FAIRBANK, supra note 32, at 59.
49 RALPH H. FOLSOM ET AL., LAW AND POLITICS IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA IN A NUTSHELL 15 (1992).
50 Such severe violations included murder of a social superior, or social
insurrection.
"' CONFUCIOUS, THE ANALECTS 2 (D.C. Lau trans., 1979).
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The Confucian socio-political-ethical system served as an
effective social regulator throughout the Imperial Period and until the
nineteenth century A.D. During the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries, when the traditional political system was defeated by the
combined effects of Japanese invasion, the influx of foreign ideas and
the general deterioration and corruption of Imperial leadership, there
existed no formalized system of legal restraints to curb the whims of
the new leadership.
B. The Emergence of Communist China
In 1912, China's Dynastic period came to an end and the old
Confucian-based social and legal order fell under attack from the
competing ideologies of the modem era, including Nationalism and
Communism. Nationalism began as a revolution of the intelligentsia,
unified by the powerful warlord and later President of Nationalist
China, Chiang K'ai-Sheck. Between 1919 and 1949, Nationalism
struggled to establish itself against the rising and ultimately
successful Chinese Communist movement. Since 1949, the
Communists have ruled China and Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong
Thought has been the dominant ideology. It marked a new approach
to government, law and politics in China, but simultaneously retained
many familiar characteristics of the uniquely traditional Chinese
approach to law and society.
The Chinese Communist revolution, led by Mao Zedong, was
a grass-roots rebellion in the tradition of Imperial Chinese rebellions.
The rebels implicitly invoked the Mandate of Heaven because Chiang
K'ai-Shek's Nationalist government failed to restore social harmony
once it took power. Unlike traditional rebellions, however, Mao
sought a complete social revolution, not merely an overthrow of the
existing government leaders. He tore down the 2000-year-old
Confucian construct and replaced it with a new Communist-based
ideology. After a brief alliance with the Soviet Union in the the early
1950s, China split with the Soviets and searched for its own
ideological model of Communism, law and society.
The mid-1950s through 1976 was a period marked by radical
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shifts in ideology and power base. Chinese-style Communism
declared itself a new and improved version of all that had preceded
it. This new ideology rejected, just as had Confucianism during the
Han Dynasty, formal law as a tool of the oppressor classes. Mao
abolished any legal codes that had been established under the Soviet
alliance, declaring that there was no need for such codes because the
people would be brought into line by following the Communist
Thought.52
The first Constitution of Communist China was promulgated
in 1954, but in practice was never referred to as a legally authoritative
document. A system of people's courts was established for purposes
of trying and reforming the "bourgeois" elements of society. All
aspects of law, including the courts, were ruled by the new ideology,
at the exclusion of all other legal tools. As announced by Chao Yuan,
President of the Higher Provincial People's Court of Fujian to the
Fujian People's Congress: "[t]he people's courts must not only
observe the policy and directives of the Party, but also obey the
direction and supervision of the Party over adjudication of actual
cases." 53 In 1957, the few law schools that were in operation altered
their curriculum from legal disciplines to political ones. 4 By 1967,
during the Cultural Revolution, all law schools were shut down
entirely.
55
In 1958, Mao decided to accelerate the Communist
transformation of China. With the "Great Leap Forward" he
instituted a policy of rapid mass collectivization of rural areas,
forming multiple agricultural and industrial collectives. All citizens
were to serve the communal goals of their collective and of the
society at large and to find motivation exclusively from the
Communist ideology. The Great Leap Forward suffered from a lack
of appropriate planning and technology and it stretched the capacity
'2 David F. Forte, Western Law and Communist Dictatorship, 32 EMORY L. J. 135,
204 (1983).
5 Id. at 190.
5 ALBERT HY CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA 29 (1992).
" Id. at 32.
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of Maoist ideology past its limits. By 1962, the Great Leap Forward
was shown to be an economic disaster with widespread food
shortages and mass discontent.5 6 As Professor John King Fairbank
noted, "[t]he revolution collapsed from general overwork and
exhaustion, the damaging of incentives and the incapacities of
management."57 Political factions within the Party competed with
Mao and favored instituting a more pragmatic and systematic
approach to economics, law and social reform.
Mao decided, however, that his revolution simply had not
gone far enough and he led the masses in the direction opposite to
pragmatism. During the Cultural Revolution, 1966-76, Mao declared
that all policies that were aimed at rationalization of government,
systemization of laws and even technical development were
revisionist and a plot against Communist revolutionary principles.
The Cultural Revolution was Mao's final attempt to institute his
personal conception of the purely ideology-driven state in perpetual
revolution. Mao organized a civilian force of unarmed
revolutionaries, the Red Guards, to spread Mao Zedong Thought and
weed out all counter-revolutionary and "revisionist" elements in the
government and universities. Top government officials, scientists
and intelligentsia were removed from their posts and sent to the
countryside for "re-education" in the ways of the peasant masses.
Such "enemies of the people," as many as 100 million by some
estimates,58 were subject to censure, discipline, public humiliation
and even death at the hands of the Red Guards.59 As Chinese scholar
Wang Xizhe noted: "the more inhuman and cruel the manner in
which one behaved toward[s] 'class enemies,' the more one showed
the firmness of one's 'proletarian class standpoint."' 60
What few positive laws existed after two decades of total
politicization were denounced in 1967 in the Communist Party
newspaper, the People's Daily, as class-based bourgeois restraint
56 FAIRBANK, supra note 32, at 408-12.
17 Id. at 413.
58 FOX BUTTERFIELD, CHINA, ALIVE IN THE BITTER SEA 17 (1982).
51 Id. at 18-19.
6 CHEN, supra note 54, at 31.
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against the revolutionary masses.6' Government was run without any
formal laws and received little or no "guidance" from the constantly
shifting, inherently unstable and radically based ideology of Maoism.
Government posts were filled by Maoist revolutionaries; the sole
criterion for appointment was devotion to Mao Zedong Thought. The
1954 Constitution was declared invalid. A new Constitution, an
ideologically self-serving document, was not promulgated until the
final year of the Cultural Revolution. Legal disputes were handled by
peasant groups following Mao Zedong thought.62
The Cultural Revolution was to be the ultimate period for
perpetual class struggle, an armageddon of ideology that was to
culminate in widespread doubt regarding any ideology, be it
Confucian or Communist. As noted by scholar Xu Xing:
Human rights and dignity were .. .deliberately
trampled upon; the theory and practice of class
struggle eroded the traditional values of benevolence,
compassion, sympathy and trust and brought into
being a society filled with suspicion, hostility and the
revolutionary "virtue" of "class hatred."
63
Shortly after the death of Mao in September of 1976, the
ideology of perpetual revolution was fully denounced and repudiated.
Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought and the radical and
frequent shifts of ideological position and power plays destroyed the
self-regulating potential of this ideologically based system. Its
capacity for protecting the people or preserving harmony during a
volatile period was exposed as inherently fragile. The period 1977 to
1989 saw a shift away from exclusively ideologically based law and
politics and a move toward systemization and rationalization. In
1980, Deng Xiaoping emerged as the leader of Communist China.
61 Id.
62 LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: COMMENTARY, READING AND
MATERIALS 12 (Ralph H. Folsom and John H. Minan eds., 1989).
63 CHEN, supra note 60, at 3 1.
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IV. THE FRAGILITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION IN MODERN
CHINA
As shown in the discussion above, the Chinese perception of
rights has always been driven by ideology and viewed from the
perspective of group interests. These culturally based perceptions
have had important implications for the character, nature and stability
of human rights in China. Our discussion now proceeds with an
analysis of the effects this heritage has had on human rights in
modern China.
A. The Effect of Ideology Over Rule of Law on Chinese Human
Rights.
Throughout the Imperial era, China's preference for ideology
over rule of law thwarted the development of an independent legal
system. Ideology defined correct action and state ideology reigned
above the law. The natural law of Confucianism backed by Daoism
nominally set a limit on the Confucian leader's discretion to make and
interpret law.' However, since it was believed that only the ruler, the
supreme sage of the worldly order, had the capacity to comprehend
the Confucian Classics and the Dao,65 the leaders answered to no one
but the mystical forces of the universe.
As discussed above, Confucianism established a
state-mandated correct moral behavior which was merged with the
social necessity of law and order. The law manifested itself primarily
as an internalized system of control through enforced moral
"1persuasion," supplemented by a limited positive legal code of
sanctions. This tradition of self-policing persists in Communist
China's merging of political institutions and power. The power to
make and pass laws, and to amend the Constitution rests with the
Turner, supra note 36, at 24.
65 Id. at 42.
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National People's Congress. 66 The power to interpret the Constitution
and review laws for their constitutionality resides in the Standing
Committee of the National People's Congress.67 The Standing
Committee is completely controlled by the National People's
Congress, which elects and has the power to recall all members of the
Standing Committee.68 Thus, the same political organ that makes
laws, and amends the Constitution, has complete control over
Constitutional review, thereby removing any institutional safeguard
against the legislature drafting laws that may be in violation of any of
the "rights" declared in the Constitution.69
While Confucianism was strong during much of the Imperial
era, its precepts and demands on the common man were basically
predictable. As foreign ideologies came to compete with
Confucianism during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
however, the populous was still predisposed to follow ideology over
rule of law and could be manipulated by the most powerful ideologue.
In modern China, Mao, while ostensibly rejecting Confucianism's
precepts, maintained that society could be re-made through education
under his new Communist ideology: "[A person] should be both red
and expert"7 was Mao's battle-cry. During the first 27 years of
Communism under Mao, the traditionally based commitment to
ideology and the lack of an independent legal system left the people
vulnerable to Mao's manipulations. As China scholar Alice E. S. Tay
noted, "[the central concept of law] is that of steering society.
'" 71
66 ZHONGUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO XIANFA [Constitution] art. 62 (P.R.C.)
[hereinafter P.R.C. CONST.I.
I d. art. 67.
"~ Id. art. 65.
" Tao-Tai Hsi & Constance A. Johnson, The Chinese Communist Party
Constitution of 1982, Deng Xiaoping's Program for Mondernization, in LAW IN
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, supra note 62, at 31.
70 "Red" refers to political goals; "expert" refers to professional characteristics.
Speeches at the Supreme State Conference, excerpts Jan. 28 and 30, 1958, in 9
CHINESE L. & GOV'T 71 (1976).
"' Alice E. S. Tay, The Struggle for Law in China, 21 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REV.
561, 580 (1987). Professor Tay was referring generally to all Communist legal
systems. Tay's comment is particularly applicable to Communist China.
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The radical and constantly changing ideological shifts under
Maoism left the people distrustful of any system based exclusively on
ideology. For the first time since the age of Legalism in the 3d
century B.C., upon the death of Mao in 1976, rule of law became an
attractive alternative to the chaos of modem ideology. As this new
pragmatism was becoming defined, a new Constitution was
promulgated in 1978. In December 1978, Deng Xiaoping asserted his
official position on rule of law at the Third Plenary Session of the
Eleventh Central Committee of the CPC:
In order to safeguard people's democracy, the legal
system must be strengthened. Democracy needs to be
institutionali[z]ed and legali[z]ed so that such a
system and such laws would not change merely
because of a change of leadership or a change in the
leaders' views and attention.72
Still, however, ideology continues to compete with the rule of law in
the hearts and minds of modem Chinese leaders as the preferred
approach to social regulation. As Professor Surya Prakash Sinha
recently noted: "Law is resorted to only when all else has failed...
Law is for the morally perverse, the incorrigible criminal, and the
foreigner who is alien to Chinese values. 73
Even the most recent Communist Constitution, which
replaced the 1978 version in 1982, describes an ideologically
motivated legal system, albeit tempered by the new pragmatism.
Several sections within the text of the Constitution itself are actually
in conflict with one another regarding the status of ideology relative
to law. Article Five, for example, seems to place rule of law above
the Party and its ideology: "[a]ll state organs, the armed forces, all
political parties and public organizations and all enterprises and
"' CHEN, supra note 54, at 33.
71 SURYA PRAKASH SINHA, JURISPRUDENCE: LEGAL PHILOSOPHY IN A NUTSHELL 32
(1993).
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undertakings must abide by the Constitution and the law." 74
The Preamble indicates, however, that the Party and
Communist ideology must be the nation's guiding force: "[u]nder the
leadership of the Communist Party of China and the guidance of
Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, the Chinese people of
all nationalities will continue to adhere to the people's democratic
dictatorship and follow the socialist road .... 75
Article One furthers the Preamble's priority of ideology over
rule of law. It declares that the working class -- the alliance of
workers and peasants -- is the leader of the "democratic
dictatorship. 7 6 The Party and its guiding ideology is thereby
established as the preeminent force, because it is through the Party
structure that this democratic dictatorship is exercised.77
The skepticism and distrust of rule of law has been integrated
into the modern Communist "class struggle." Recently, Justice
Minister Cai Cheng declared that, "China must jettison the concept
of 'the supremacy of the law' because the judicial code and system
must be at the service of the proletariat class.78 The President of the
Supreme People's Court, Ren Jianzin, stated, "[i]t is a mistake to
think that, because there is law, justice can be executed without the
guidance of [Party] policies.
7 9
Strong indications exist, however, that certain sectors of the
population genuinely do support a system based on rule of law. A
1982 editorial in the People's Daily extols the following warning
which is most significant for human rights in modem China. "Not to
emphasi[z]e the legal system, not following the law and acting as if
there were no law above oneself -- this benefits bad elements and
does not benefit the people. This painful lesson is one which we must
74 P.R.C. CONST. ch. I, art. 5.
71 Id. pmnbl.
71 Id. ch. 1, art. i.
77 BASIC PRINCIPLES OF LAW 102 (Central Party School Law Unit ed., 1984).
71 Willy Wo-lap Lain, Justice Minister Rejects Suprenmacy of the Law, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Nov. 12, 1991 at 12.
79 FOLSOM, supra note 49, at 93.
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always remember."80
B. Universal Harmony and its Implications for Individually Based
Human Rights.
The supreme goal of universal harmony has had three
important effects for modem perceptions of human rights in China.
First, it established a firm preference for formal mediation over
litigation for questions of rights and violations of law.8 In the
absence of arbitration, rights, if they are recognized at all, are never
clarified or enforced by the courts. The adversarial nature of
arbitration has indirect, but highly significant benefits for human
rights development because it aims at illuminating and refining the
legal issues; where rights are involved, they are defined, refined and
acknowledged. The judge's decision decides which legal argument
is best and most indicative of justice and by his holding, the judge
identifies and authorizes the existence of a right. As China scholar
Alice E. S. Tay noted:
A social ethic oriented toward mediation and
compromise, toward recognizing the extent to which
another person's emotions and dignity are involved in
his claim, rather than toward the abstract question of
the justice of his claim, is likely to avoid any clear,
uncompromising definition of rights or claims ab
initio.
82
Since community harmony and the hierarchical social code
demanded strict submission to the authority of one's superiors, even
the most seemingly trivial challenge to the hierarchy was
unacceptable. Challenging one's father was viewed as a threat to
"0 CHEN, supra note 54, at 35.
81 Tay, supra note 71, at561.
82 Id. at 561-62.
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society similar to rebellion against the emperor.83 Only where one
was morally justified in challenging authority, as under the Mandate
of Heaven when the emperor was deemed to be acting contrary to the
interests of the community, could such a challenge be acceptable.
Even then, whether the rebellion was justified was directly dependent
upon the success of the challenge. An unsuccessful rebellion was,
retroactively, an unjustified one.
Maintenance of harmony, in the modem context, has come to
mean political repression. The government strictly regulates political
participation so as to avoid the possibility of rebellion. During the
Tiananmen Square protests of 1989, students, teachers, workers,
government employees and the press peacefully assembled and called
for official recognition of civil, political, economic, social and
cultural human rights.84 In response, the government declared martial
law approximately one month into the protest, which remained in
effect for nearly eight months. Two weeks following the imposition
of martial law, a clash between the protesters and government troops
led to the killing of at least one thousand unarmed civilians.8" It is
difficult to justify such extreme repression even in Chinese culturally
based rights terms.
C. Human Rights as Citizens'Duties at the Service of the Communist
State
While individual human rights offended traditional China's
hierarchical social order and the goal of universal harmony,
individual duties advanced these traditions. One's duties were
derived from one's place in the social order. Rights existed, if at all,
only as a reflection of the duties owed in a reciprocal Confucian
relationship. For example, a son owed a duty of filial piety to his
father, and the father had the right to have this duty fulfilled.8 6 The
83 FAIRBANK, supra note 32, at 71-74.
'4 KENT, supra note 36, at 1-2.
" id. at 1.
86 HYUNG I KiM, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTS OF CHINA AND THE WEST 120
(1981).
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ruler owed a duty to heaven and earth to maintain social harmony.
The subjects, in return, owed the emperor a duty of loyalty to follow
his example in ordered living and submission to his greater judgment.
The state did not owe any duty to any individual and no person could
demand individual rights from the state. No concept of rights existed
apart from these social and moral duties.
Like the traditional conception of rights as duties, the rights
granted in the 1982 Communist Constitution are directly linked to
individual duties. "Rights" are conferred by the state to its citizens.
This means that "rights" in China exist at the prerogative of the state,
and are only awarded to those who are legally recognized and
participating members of society who fulfill their duties to the state.
Since they are granted by the state, with certain provisions attached,
"rights" may also be modified or lifted by the state. As China scholar,
R. P. Peerenboom notes:
[T]he existence of duties per se does not account so
much for the detriment to the individual as the fact
that duties are owed to the state and the demands upon
the individual in the name of socialism are essentially
unlimited, defined primarily by the transitory dictates
of the Party.
7
The first forty-nine articles of the Chinese Communist
Constitution cite more rights than are expressly stated in the United
States Constitution and nearly as many rights as are contained in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 88 Despite this fact, the
87 Peerenboom, supra note 36, at 49.
88 The 1982 Chinese Communist Constitution addresses a substantial number of the
economic, social and cultural rights articulated by the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. Some of the internationally recognized human rights which are
articulated in the 1982 Chinese Communist Constitution include the following:
(1) Popular sovereignty, in article 2;
(2) Respect for and non-discrimination of ethnic minorities, in article
4;
(3) Right to own property, in article 13;
(4) Promotion of medical care and public health and sanitation, in
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Chinese Constitution cannot be interpreted as a guarantor of rights.
Rather, it is more nearly a descriptive statement of goals, a blueprint
of sorts describing what may be and can be, but not what must be.8 9
As Professor Louis Henkin describes:
[T]he Chinese constitution does not claim to be a
contract among the people establishing the state, or a
contract between the government and the people
setting forth the conditions under which the people are
prepared to be governed. It is a manifesto, by the
leaders to the people, describing the society that exists
and its institutions, and proclaiming its values, goals
and aspirations.9"
China scholar Jerome Cohen characterized the Communist
article 21;
(5) Protection of the natural environment in article 26;
(6) Equality among citizens in article 33;
(7) Right to vote and participate in elections, in article 34;
(8) Freedom of speech, press, assembly, association, procession and
demonstration, in article 35;
(9) Freedom of religious belief in article 36;
(10) Freedom of person in article 37;
(11) Freedom from unlawful search and seizure, in articles 37 and 39;
(12) Freedom and privacy of correspondence in article 40;
(13) Freedom to criticize the government, in article 41;
(14) Right and duty to work, in article 42;
(15) Right to rest and leisure time, in article 43;
(16) Right to subsidized retirement, in article 44;
(17) Right to material assistance from the state and society when old,
ill, or disabled, in article 45;
(18) Duty and right to receive education, in a mother and child, and
old people, in article 49.
P.R.C. CONST. (1982).
89 EDWARDS, supra note 36, at 52-53.
90 HENKIN, supra note 36, at 26.
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Constitution 9' as: a formalization of existing power configurations
rather than an authentic institutional framework for adjusting
relations among political forces that compete for power.
9 2
Professor Owen Fiss, in comparing the Chinese Constitutions
with the United States Bill of Rights, concludes that it is the "quantity
and quality of [the] limits" that distinguishes the Chinese
Constitution.93 The 1982 Communist Constitution permits a
significant number of limits on citizens' rights. All individual rights
are qualified by Article fifty-one, which asserts the unequivocal
priority of group interests over individual rights:
The exercise of citizens of the People's Republic of
China of their freedoms and rights may not infringe
upon the interests of the state, of society and of the
collective, or upon the lawful freedoms and rights of
other citizens. '"
Rights are also circumscribed by Article fifty-four: "[ilt is the
duty of citizens of the People's Republic of China to safeguard the
security, honor and interest of the motherland; they must not commit
acts detrimental to the security, honor and interests of the
motherland.""
Qualitatively, individual rights are greatly restricted in their
practical scope. For example, Professor Fiss discusses the qualitative
difference between free speech under the Chinese and American
Constitutions:
9' Cohen was referring to the 1978 Communist Constitution, but his comments are
applicable to the current Constitution.
92 J.A. Cohen, China's Changing Constitution, 9 CHINA Q. 834, 836-37 (1978).
" Owen M. Fiss, Two Constitutions, 11 YALE J. INT'LL. 492, 495 (1986).
94 P.R.C. CONST. art. 51.
9' Id. art. 54. This provision is utilized by the government to justify suppression
of democratic demonstrations, such as Tiananmen Square in 1989, which are
considered counter-revolutionary and threats to the security, honor and interests of
the motherland.
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Free speech in America imposes a limit on statutes or
executive or judicial action; it cuts into the law. In
China, even under the new constitution, free speech
appears as a residue; it remains after we have reached
the outer boundary of the statute (or other form of
law). Article thirty-five tells citizens what they might
do,96 but is not a restriction on the power of the state.
They are allowed to engage in speech that is lawful.
In America, individuals are not told what they might
do -- it is understood that they could do everything not
denied -- but limitations are placed on the state.97
The Preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
in contrast with the Chinese Communist Constitution, pronounces
individual rights to be inherent and supreme. Article twenty-nine
limits rights only where they are in direct conflict with group
interests, and only to the extent necessary to preserve such interests:
In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone
shall be subject only to such limitations as are
determined by law solely for the purpose of securing
due recognition and respect for the rights and
freedoms of others and of meeting the just
requirements of morality, public order and the general
welfare in a democratic society.98
Thus, we see that the fragile protection of rights in modem
China harks back to a Confucian-style tradition of self-policing
among the people, the leaders and organs of government. Such
protection suppresses individualism and evades rights definition. The
Chinese perception of human rights is propelled by the Communist
')' Article 35 of the 1982 Constitution states: "Citizens of the People's Republic of
China enjoy freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of
procession and of demonstration." P.R.C. CONST. art. 35.
, Fiss, supra note 93, at 497.
' P.R.C. CONST. art. 29.
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ideology and emphasizes the interests of the community at the
expense of individual interests. Finally, the "rights" of the individual
are defined relative to his duties to the community, and are subject to
qualification, restriction and repression, as defined by the Communist
Party elite.
V. UNIVERSALITY VERSUS A CULTURALLY RELATIVISTIC
APPROACH TO HUMAN RIGHTS
The Chinese priority of group interests over individual rights
leads to a preference for group-oriented rights and privileges.99 This
priority results in the suppression of individually based political
rights."° Political rights are viewed in a similar capacity as China has
viewed rule of law: they are artificial constructs, which are
unnecessary in an ideologically sustained culture, and serve only the
interests of the individual. Group rights, such as subsistence rights,
on the other hand, benefit all of society. China asserts that economic
and social rights serve advance the national interest and that their
implementation must take priority over any political rights concerns.
Scholars in the fields of politics, philosophy, law and human
rights have debated the culturally relativistic approach to human
rights. The next sections will examine some theories of cultural
relativism and then proceed with a discussion of the new universality
principle.
A. Cultural Relativism
The general argument in support of cultural relativism
9 Group-oriented rights generally include subsistence economic rights, as well as
social and cultural rights. For a catalogue of these rights as recognized by the
international community, see the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, supra note 3.
0 Individually based rights, or "first generation rights" are described by the
international community in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
and its Optional Protocols, supra note 3.
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maintains that an individual nation should have the prerogative of
prioritizing rights in a manner appropriate to its culture and political
and economic circumstances. 101 Cultural relativist theorists tend to
focus on those nations that prefer economic rights over political
freedoms. Opponents to cultural relativism normally attack the
theory by showing the importance of political rights even where
economic concerns are present.
Particularly for economically poor nations, the cultural
relativist asserts that the satisfaction of sustenance needs is of far
greater concern than individual political interests." 2 Where political
institutions are either weak or so new to the culture that they are
ineffective, political participation normally results in social chaos.
Distribution of sustenance needs is made more difficult, if not
impossible by such social chaos. Once economic development is
attained and all people are fed, clothed, have ajob and a place to live,
then the priority may possibly shift to political rights and
institution-building, depending upon the particular circumstances of
the nation. According to the "full-belly" thesis, a man's belly must be
full before he can indulge in the "luxury" of worrying about his
political freedoms.0 3
Rhoda Howard patently denies the proposition that the
resolution of economic and political human rights in developing
countries should or even can be a sequential process. She notes that
without political rights, no checks exist on government to ensure the
equitable distribution of the products of economic development.
Howard asserts that "psychological sustenance," as distinct from
physical sustenance, requires that citizens feel a sense of personal
dignity and individual control or influence over their own lives."
... See Jack Donnelly, Cultural Relativism and Universal Human Rights, 6 HUM.
RTs. Q. 400 (1984).
'02 Human Rights in an East Asian Perspective, in EAST ASIA 3-33 (James C.
Hsiung ed., 1985).
"o Rhoda Howard, The Full-Belly Thesis: Should Economic Rights Take Priority
Over Civil and Political Rights? Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa, 5 HUM. RTS.
Q. 467,469 (1983).
10i Id.
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This human dignity can be guaranteed only through civil and political
human rights. Thus, Howard states, "suspension of civil and political
rights in these countries until after economic development has been
achieved will in effect mean that neither development nor rights will
be attained."'0 5
Han S. Park proposes a dialectic or mutually reinforcing
relationship between economic and political human rights and
development. "Human dignity," Park notes, "cannot be guaranteed by
political rights alone, nor are the political rights perfectible without
economic and social rights."'0 6  According to Park's thesis, the
suspension of any one of the categories of human rights -- economic,
social or political -- retards the development of all human rights. 7
Clearly, there is validity to the argument that sustenance rights
are important. Neither sustenance rights nor political rights, however,
are the exclusive domain of particular cultures. A culturally
relativistic approach should not disfavor either body of rights.'0 8
,05 Id. at 490.
'0 Han S. Park, Human Rights and Modernization: A Dialectical Relationship? 2
UNIV. HUM. RTS 86 (1980).
107 Id.
308 According to the Vienna Declaration on Human Rights, cultural relativism is a
discarded theory, replaced by the Universality thesis. U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.157/23 (1993) [hereinafter Vienna Declaration]. At the United Nations
World Human Rights Conference,.the Vienna Declaration was endorsed
unanimously by all participants, including the People's Republic of China. United
Nations World Human Rights Conference, supra note I.
1995-96] UNIVERSALITY VERSUS CULTURAL RELATIMSM 317
B. The Universality Principle
The Universality position consists of four elements. °9 First,
universality condemns the practice of prioritizing human rights within
a country or community, and particularly disdains the repression or
exclusion of one or more "generation""'  of rights. Second,
universality holds that human rights are inherently universal"' and
that international human rights instruments provide a basic minimum
standard of compliance."' This means that regardless of the cultural
context, the human rights contained in the Universal Declaration of
Human rights, among other international instruments, are universally
applicable and universally morally binding. As stated in the Vienna
Declaration:
All human rights are universal, indivisible and
inter-dependent and inter-related. The international
community must treat human rights globally in a fair
and equal manner in the same footing, and with the
same emphasis. While the significance of national
and regional particularities and various historical,
cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in
mind, it is the duty of states, regardless of their
political, economic and cultural systems, to promote
and protect all human rights and fundamental
freedoms. 3
109 Vitit Muntarbhorn, Tie Universality of Standards, lecture at the Rene Cassin
International Institute of Human Rights, July 1993.
"" Civil and Political rights are referred to as first generation rights; economic,
social and cultural rights are "second generation;" and group rights, including
national and world peace and economic development are "third generation." KENT,
supra note 36, at 5-6.
.. Universal rights extend across national boundaries and embrace all cultures and
peoples.
1-" Muntarbhorn, supra note 109.
113 Vienna Declaration, supra note 108, 3.
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Third, where international norms and national standards are in direct
conflict, the international standards must prevail."4 Finally, it is the
duty of the international community to enforce international human
rights, and such enforcement must not be considered an unlawful
intrusion on domestic sovereignty." 5
Of the 180 nations that attended the World Conference and
debated over the drafting stage of the Vienna Declaration, all
participants approved of the final document. It is important, however,
to note that the Vienna Declaration, like all United Nations
declarations, is not a legally binding document. It is merely a morally
persuasive declaration of principles. Furthermore, in the face of
unanimous approval, many of the nations that approved the document
also registered formal reservations and disagreement with select
words or passages.
The debate over universality versus cultural relativism is not
at an end with the approval of the Vienna Declaration. It has merely
shifted to subtler expressions of position. To a large degree, cultural
relativism has been dressed up in new terms which ostensibly favor
universality, but in reality reject it.
For example, Counselor Timothy E. Wirth, Director of the
United States Delegation to the World Conference, in support of
universality has stated:
[The United States] respect[s] the cultural differences
that make all societies and countries unique. But
when we talk about human rights, we cannot qualify
them by making exceptions. No accident of birth,
culture or geography limits a human being's
inalienable rights .... Our commitment to human
rights is global, just as the United Nations Declaration
is universal. 116
114 Muntarbhorn, supra note 109.
115 Id.
116 Materials from the United States Delegation to the Vienna Conference (on file
with the author).
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Yet, in a United States Delegation Fact Sheet distributed at the
World Conference, the United States position on universality asserts
that, "[Respect for and protection of individual human rights] must
be the basis for economic growth and development -- not an end-
product of prosperity."' 17 This latter statement appears to separate the
concept of human rights from economic growth and development
although economic growith and development are integral elements of
the rights described in the Universal Covenant on Social, Economic
and Cultural Rights. This policy of separation belies the spirit of the
Vienna Declaration 18 and the universality principle as it distinguishes
economic and development rights from the greater body of human
rights. Indeed, the United States appears to continue to place political
freedoms above economic rights and fails even to recognize explicitly
economic growth and development as a right. Compare this with
China's official statement on Universality: it is a simple truth that, for
any country or nation, the right to subsistence is the most important
of all human rights, without which the other rights are out of the
question.'' 9
At the Bangkok Conference, 120 representatives of forty-nine
Asian nations revealed their preferences for cultural relativism in the
Bangkok Declaration:
[We] recognize that while human rights are universal
in nature, they must be considered in the context of a
dynamic and evolving process of International
norm-setting, bearing in mind the significance of
national and regional particularities and various
"7 Fact Sheet: US Human Rights Goals and Objectives (on file with the author)
(emphasis added).
118 Vienna Declaration, supra note 108.
"' Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China,
Human Rights in China: 'The White Paper,' 34 BELTING REv. Nov. 4-10, 1991, at
8.
2o The Bangkok Conference was a preparatory. ieeting to the Vienna World
Conference for leaders of Asian nations.
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historical, cultural and religious backgrounds ....
Human rights must take into account a nation's
historical background and culture. Western-based
"international" human rights threatens Asia's right to
sovereignty (to choose what rights they deem to be
important) and right to development (because under
international instruments, political rights must be
instituted with no delay, and economic rights may be
instituted at the pace and within the resources of the
given country).'12
Like the Bangkok Declaration, the Tunis Declaration
2 2
reflects the culturally relativistic views of African leaders and states,
in relevant part:
The observance and promotion of human rights are
undeniably a global concern and an objective to the
reali[z]ation of which all states, without exception, are
called upon to contribute. However, no ready-made
model can be prescribed at the universal level since
the historical and cultural realities of each nation and
the traditions, standards and values of each people
cannot be disregarded.2 3
Yang Xiyu, a member of China's delegation to the World
Conference and an officer of China's Institute of Contemporary
International Relations expressed his culturally relativistic views:
"Who can say which is the best? We should allow people to think
about human rights in different ways.., we should follow national
121 Bangkok Declaration on Human Rights, English version, item 8, adopted by
Asian States, March, 1993 (emphasis added).
.22 The Tunis Conference was a preparatory meeting of African States to the
Vienna World Conference and was held in 1992.
'23 Tunis Declaration, Item 5 (emphasis added).
1995-96] UNIVERSAIJTY VERSUS CULTURAL RELATIVISM 321
conditions, situations and uniqueness."'24
A political activist at the Bangkok Conference accused the
Universality principle of Western bias, asserting that only cultural
prejudice, not cultural relativism, could "explain why a country which
feeds 1.2 billion human beings -- an unparalleled accomplishment in
the annals of human history - is dismissed contemptuously as a
country which has no human rights record."'25
Thus, the debate between universality and cultural relativism
rages on.'26 China perceives all rights as privileges awarded by, and
subject to the discretion of the state. When rights are discussed in
China, China's leaders unequivocally favor economic and other
group-oriented privileges and reject political freedoms. Xiao Qiang,
director of Human Rights China 27 proposes one resolution to the
conflict: "[t]here are cultural differences and specific differences
between countries, but that doesn't mean that citizens cannot enjoy
human rights standards. It just means [that non-governmental
organizations] and governments must find their own practical
solutions to achieve it.'
' 28
VI. TOWARD AN INTEGRATED APPROACH OF UNIVERSAL
STANDARDS AND CULTURAL SENSITIVITY
This paper has attempted to show how the different nations of
the world community speak distinct languages of human rights. At
the United Nations World Conference of Human Rights, when
24 Leah Makabenta, Western Wrongs, Asian Rights, TERRA VIVA, June 14, 1993
at 8 (daily newspaper printed for the Vienna Conference).
2 Sidney Jones, Culture Clash, J. HUMAN RTs. CHINA, Summer 1993, at 8-9, 22.
126 The United States continues to resist recognizing or guaranteeing economic
rights on the same footing as political rights.
27 Human Rights China, China's only officially recognized human rights
organization, participated in the protest which was suppressed at Tiananmen Square
in 1989.
128 Obinna Anyadike, Rights Group Slams China, TERRA VIVA, June 14, 1993 at
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Chinese delegates declared acceptance of the Universality principle,
they were saying, "all rights that we recognize to be rights are
universal."'' 9 Since "rights," as such, are translated as duties in the
language of Chinese human rights, and political human rights, in
particular are not part of the Chinese cultural tradition, China can
assent to the principle of Universality. Meanwhile, it can guarantee
no human rights at all, and instead grants a select group of rights as
qualified privileges at the discretion of the state. Such an approach
to rights compromises the integrity of Universality and threatens its
usefulness as a principle of international human rights.
One step toward a solution may be for the world community
to formally acknowledge China's distinct cultural heritage and social
needs and to recognize its accomplishments in human rights13 on
Chinese terms. This solution would be an integration of the
Universality principle with a measure of cultural sensitivity. Such an
acknowledgment, however, must not excuse violations of
international norms. Culturally based Chinese rights must not be at
the expense of the fundamental rights defined by the international
community.
"9 This statement applies not just to China, but also the United States and most
other nations.
'30 The Communist Party can certainly be credited with making significant
advances toward meeting its citizens basic subsistence needs of food, shelter, work
and medical care.
